A review of 107 gender equality claims reaching the Supreme Court since Reed v. Reed (1971) indicates that the Court's treatment of abortion rights claims differed greatly from non abortion claims. The Court's changing makeup was strongly related to its support for abortion rights, but not to its support for nonabortion gender equality claims. Litigants and legal facts strongly affected the Court's support for nonabortion gender equality claims, but not abortion claims. Public opinion indicators were either unrelated (to nonabortion gender equality claims) or showed an unexpected, negative linkage (to abortion rights claims).
T o d ate, sch o lars h av e n o t used statistical tech n iq u es to d irectly c o m p a re the stren g th o f so m e ex p lan a tio n s v ersu s o th e rs. T h is article re ex am in es th e S u p re m e C o u rt's g e n d e r eq u ality ru lin g s fro m 1971 th ro u g h th e 1993 te rm , testin g sev e ral th eo ries to e x p lain w h y the S u p re m e C o u rt has su p p o rte d so m e g e n d e r e q u a lity claim s, b u t n o t o th e rs. A to tal o f 107 g e n d e r eq u a lity claim s re c e iv e d a full C o u rt op in io n d u rin g th e 1 9 7 1 -1 9 9 3 C o u rt te rm s -an a v e ra g e o f 4 .4 claim s p e r term .
T h e se 107 claim s ra ise d a w id e v arie ty o f claim s, in c lu d in g o n -th e-jo b w o rk p la c e claim s, a b o rtio n claim s, c rim in a l rig h ts c la im s, p en sio n rights c la im s, s tu d e n ts ' claim s, an d m ilita ry se rv ic e claim s, am o n g o th e rs. As n o ted e lse w h e re (B aer 1 991), g e n d e r eq u ality claim s do n o t in clu d e only . O v erall, the C o u rt su p p o rte d ro u g h ly th re e o f ev e ry fiv e su ch claim s ra ise d -su p p o rtin g 63 claim s (5 9 % ) and re je c tin g 4 4 claim s (4 1 % ). M o re sp ec ific ally , the C o u rt su p p o rte d 53 p e r c e n t o f the 40 ab o rtio n rig h ts claim s, and 63 p ercen t o f 67 n o n a b o rtio n g e n d e r rig h ts claim s.
S u p re m e C o u r t S u p p o r t f o r G e n d e r E q u a lity C la im s H o w b est can o n e ex p lain w h en the U nited States S u p rem e C o u rt w ill s u p p o rt an a b o rtio n o r n o n ab o rtio n g e n d e r eq u ality claim ? T h e av ailab le literature, reviewed below, offers four explanations from which several testable hypotheses can be derived. Each of these four explanations is outlined below, then tested.
The Supreme Court's Composition
The first explanation is that the Supreme Court's support for gender equality is related to the Supreme Court's own composition. In particular, the election of a series of Republican presidents during the 1970s and 1980s led to the appointment of a steadily growing number of conservative Repub lican justices, compared to earlier decades. This argument is widely cited for abortion rights claims (Savage 1992) . As well, during this period the Court's first (then second) woman justice joined the brethren.
Several variables are available for testing. The first two variables (both ratio-level) measure either the number of Republican justices on the Court, or alternatively, the number of Reagan-Bush appointees (all of whom were Republicans). For both predictors, the hypothesis is that the greater the number of Republicans (or Reagan-Bush Republicans), the lower the support for either abortion or nonabortion gender equality claims. Because the Reagan-Bush appointees were "abortion-cleared" (or at least "abortionscrutinized"), the hypothesis is made more strongly for the Reagan-Bush appointees and for abortion claims (Savage 1992; Epstein and Kobylka 1992; Stidman, Carp, and Rowland 1983) .
A third predictor is the number of women members on the Supreme Court, ranging from 0 (until 1981) to 1 to 2 (only for the 1993) term. Several accounts have debated whether women justices are especially sensi tive to gender rights claims, or whether a woman justice's presence influ ences other justices ' votes, as well ( O'Connor and Epstein 1983; O'Connor and Segal 1990; Savage 1992; Miller 1985; Gryski, Main, and Dixon 1986; Sherry 1986 ). The hypothesis is that the greater the number of women on the Court, the greater the Court's support for gender rights claims will beat least when controlling for the Supreme Court's changing composition over time. Because Sandra Day O'Connor was the only woman justice from 1981 until the 1993 term, this variable is also tested as a simple (0,1) dummy variable to test the presence or absence of Justice O'Connor.
American Public Opinion
A second explanation is that the Supreme Court responds either directly or indirectly to prevailing American public opinion. The Court might follow American public opinion directly if justices "sense and share" public senti o ften su p p o rt g e n d e r rig h ts claim s w hen the D em o cratic ca n d id a te fo r P re s i dent wins a larger share of the total popular vote, or alternatively, a larger share of the two-party vote.9 The ninth prediction is that the Court's support for gender rights claims will reflect the growing number of women elected to the U.S. House of Representatives.
Litigants Involved
A third explanation is that the Supreme Court's rulings in gender equal ity and abortion rights claims might be influenced by the litigants involved. Several accounts have argued that the U.S. Solicitor General strongly influ ences the Supreme Court's decision-making, and may be the most (arguably, the only) significant influence on Supreme Court decision-making apart from the justices' own ideological views (Caplan 1987; Segal 1984; Segal and Spaeth 1993) . This predictor measures the Solicitor General's position on a gender rights claim, coded as ( + 1) for supporting the claim, (0) if not par ticipating in the case, and (-1) if opposing a claim. The prediction is that the Solicitor General's support is more strongly related to Supreme Court sup port for gender and abortion rights claims than is any other predictor (Segal and Spaeth 1993) .
A second indicator here is whether a federal law or policy is involved. Typically, the Supreme Court is much more deferential toward federal-level, than to state-or local-level laws and policies (Abraham 1987, 67) . Federal laws and policies supportive of the gender rights claim are coded as ( + 1); federal laws or policies which oppose the claim are coded as (-1); otherwise (0). The prediction is that gender rights claims will fare better when the federal law or policy supports the claim.10 A third indicator is whether a state-or local-level law or policy is involved in the gender rights claim. The prediction is that the Court will be less influenced by state-or local laws than by federal laws. This variable is coded similarly to the federal level variable just described.
A fourth indicator is region. Some evidence suggests that Southern states fare less well than nonSouthern states when their laws and policies are challenged at the Supreme Court (Hagle 1992; Epstein and O'Connor 1988) . The prediction is that the Court will more often support a gender equality claim arising from a Southern state than from another part of the nation. Cases from the South are coded as 1, otherwise 0.
The Supreme Court may also possibly respond to the number or type of interest groups filing an amicus brief in the lawsuit. Here, three further indicators were tested: the number of interest groups filing an amicus brief in favor of the rights claim, the number filing an amicus against the rights claims, and the total number of groups filing amicus briefs. The number and ty p e s o f in te re s t g ro u p s in v o lv e d m ay c u e th e C o u rt to th e im p o rta n c e o f th e c la im in v o lv e d . B e c a u se p a st re s e a rc h h as n o t s h o w n th a t a m ic u s b r ie f fil in g s s ig n ific a n tly im p a c t th e C o u r t's ru lin g s at th e fu ll d e c is io n s ta g e , all th e se v a ria b le s a re p re d ic te d to b e u n re la te d to th e C o u r t's ru lin g s (E p s te in a n d R o w la n d 1 9 91; C a ld e ira a n d W rig h t 1 9 8 8 ).
F a c ts a n d C irc u m s ta n c e s T h e fo u rth e x p la n a tio n o f th e S u p re m e C o u r t's s u p p o r t f o r a b o rtio n rig h ts o r g e n d e r e q u a lity rig h ts fo c u s e s o n le g a l fa c ts in v o lv e d in th e c a se .
S e v e ra l p u b lis h e d a c c o u n ts h a v e s u g g e s te d th a t le g a l fa c ts "m a tte r" in S u p re m e C o u rt d e c is io n -m a k in g (S e g a l 1 9 8 4 ; G e o rg e a n d E p s te in 1 9 9 2 ). A w id e v a rie ty o f fa c ts a
C a s e fa c ts p re d ic te d to h a v e a p o s itiv e e ffe c t o n a g e n d e r e q u a lity claim in c lu d e : a n o n -th e -jo b w o rk p la c e c la im , a p e n s io n rig h ts c la im , a w o rk p la c e p re g n a n c y c la im , o r a ju r y c o m p o s itio n c la im . B y c o n tr a s t, se v e ra l o th e r fa c ts w e re p re d ic te d to b e n e g a tiv e ly re la te d to th e S u p re m e C o u r t's a c c e p ta n c e o f a g e n d e r rig h ts c la im , in c lu d in g : a c la im m a d e b y a c rim in a l d e fe n d a n t, a c la im f o r re tro a c tiv e a p p lic a tio n , a c la im a s s e rte d b y a m in o r o r by a s tu d e n t, a n in tra -fa m ily c u s to d y c la im , a c la im a s s e rte d b y a m a le , a claim w h ic h w o u ld fo rc e a u n it o f g o v e rn m e n t to fin a n c e a n e w a c tiv ity , o r a c la im in v o lv in g m ilita ry s e rv ic e . M o r e g e n e ra lly , th e C o u r t is a lso p re d ic te d to tre a t a b o rtio n c la im s less fa v o ra b ly th a n w o rk p la c e c la im s (G o ld s te in 1 9 8 8 ; E p s te in a n d K o b y lk a 1 9 9 2 ). B e c a u se m a n y o f th e se sp e c ific fa c ts o r c irc u m s ta n c e s a p p e a r in o n ly a h a n d fu l o f th e 107 c la im s e D a ta R e s u lts a n d D is c u ss io n B e c a u se th e n u m b e r o f c a se s is re la tiv e ly sm a ll c o m p a re d to th e la rg e n u m b e r o f p re d ic to rs , a n d b e c a u s e m a n y v a ria b le s a re s tro n g ly in te rc o rre la te d , th e v a ria b le s w e re firs t te ste d in d iv id u a lly a g a in s t th e d e p e n d e n t variable-whether the Supreme Court supported or opposed the gender equality claim (coded as 1,0, respectively). Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, the predictors were tested in probit equations. Table 1 reports the strength and significance of the predictors, tested one-by-one. The results in Table 1 suggest that gender equality claims and abortion rights claims over the last two decades reflect very different legal patterns. Combined, all 107 claims are not well predicted by the variables, and only a few variables help to explain the Supreme Court's pattern of decision making.11 Support for claims was significantly related to the Solicitor General's position and to legal facts; abortion claims also received less support than nonabortion claims. The Democratic candidate's share of vote for president, however, was significantly, but negatively related to Court support for gender equality claims. This unexpected finding can be ex plained by the dwindling (but still winning) vote margins of Republican presidents who continued to appoint conservative and Republican justices to the Court (Mishler and Sheehan 1993) .
When separately analysed, the different patterns of decision-making for abortion versus nonabortion claims become readily apparent. For abortion claims, the growing number of Republican (or Reagan-Bush Republican) justices is especially important. Ironically, the strength of Democratic presidential candidates and public opinion poll support for women's role in the workplace is also significantly, albeit negatively related to the Court's acceptance of abortion claims. None of the litigants or judicial facts tested could significantly predict the outcome of abortion claims.
For the nonabortion gender equality claims, a very different structure of decision-making is apparent. Neither the Court composition variables nor the public opinion variables significantly predicted Supreme Court support for nonabortion gender equality claims. Instead the Court's decisions were more closely linked to the the Solicitor General's position and to the number of pro-claim amicus briefs, as well as to legal facts in the claims.
How well can these variables explain abortion and nonabortion gender equality claims? A variety of probit models were tested, combining predic tors into a multivariate model. On grounds of parsimony, predictive success, or theoretical clarity, a few probit models stood out and are reported in Tables 2a, 2b, and 3. T a b l e 1 . S u p r e m e C o u r t S u p p o r t f o r G e n d e r R i g h t s C l a i m s ( T a b l e E n t r i e s i n d i c a t e M . L . E . / S . E . a n d S i g n i f i c a n c e L e v e l s ) For abortion claims, the strongest predictive model included the vari ables representing attitudes toward women in the workplace and the share of the presidential vote received by the Democratic candidate. Both predic tors, however, were significantly but negatively related to Supreme Court support for abortion rights claims.
The two-predictor model reported in Table 2a successfully predicted 82 percent of the abortion rights claims, compared with a 53 percent base rate-or a 62 percent improvement over the base rate. The success of this model over this period , however, does not reflect a direct causal linkage, but rather the typical success of Republican presidents to win increasingly narrow election victories; once elected, these Republican presi dents appointed conservative and Republican nominees to the Court who often voted against abortion rights claims. As Mishler and Sheehan (1993) have pointed out, this model illustrates the growing gap between Supreme Court decision-making and American public sentiment.
Although the two-predictor model reported in Table 2a best predicted outcomes, it is not theoretically satisfying. An alternative model for abortion claims is reported in Table 2b , and includes only a single predictor-the number of Republican justices. This model also significantly improves over the base rate, correctly predicting 70 percent of the abortions rights claims. While it is not so successful as the two-predictor model just described, it does reflect more clearly the impact of the appointments process on this highly politicized area of Supreme Court decision-making (Savage 1992) .
For nonabortion gender equality claims, the best probit equation included only two predictors: the Solicitor General's position and the index representing the legal facts in the case. Both these variables are theoretically satisfying, and reflect the more traditional facts-and-litigants-based "legal model" of judicial decision-making (George and Epstein 1992) . Both predic tors were also related to Supreme Court support in the expected manner (see Table 3 .) This two-predictor model successfully predicted 80 percent of the nonabortion gender equality claims, compared to a 63 percent base rate-an improvement of 54 percent over the base rate.
When all 107 claims were combined, none of several probit equation models tested could significantly improve over the base rate prediction level.12 Overall, these results suggest that the Court's many gender equality rulings-both for the abortion and nonabortion claims-were not completely ad hoc rulings without a structure. The decision-making structure of abortion rights claims, however, differed greatly from nonabortion gender equality claims, and these two lines of rulings are sufficiently different that they are better analysed separately.
Perhaps surprisingly, American public opinion-however measureddid not demonstrate any positive linkage to Supreme Court decision-making in gender equality claims. For abortion claims, most of the public opinion coefficients in Table 1 were either statistically insignificant or significant, but negative. For nonabortion claims, none of the direct or indirect indica tors of public opinion were significant at all. These results suggest that, unlike most other areas of civil liberties and civil rights claims (Ignagni and Marshall 1994) , American public opinion clearly failed to influence Supreme Court decision-making on gender equality claims.
The very different decision-making structure represented by the abor tion versus nonabortion claims farther suggests that even within the same time period, the Supreme Court may give differing weight to legal versus extralegal variables (George and Epstein 1992) . The evidence here suggests that the nonabortion gender equality claims were not "politicized" in the same way as were abortion claims, and that the growing number of Repub lican and conservative justices did not negatively impact these claims in the same way as in the highly publicized abortion cases. The Supreme Court's distinction between abortion and nonabortion rights claims mirrors the dis tinction frequently drawn in public debate over feminist issues since the early 1970s. For example, during the debate over ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment, many of the amendment's supporters argued that ratification would not affect access to abortion (Fielder 1984; Alexander and Fielder 1980; Mathew and DeHart 1990; Mansbridge 1986 ).
Finally, these results also suggest that the partisanship of newlyappointed Supreme Court justices may significantly impact the Supreme Court's support for abortion rights claims, but not the Court's support for nonabortion gender equality claims. A hypothetical increase from one Demo cratic justice to three Democratic justices on the Supreme Court, for example, markedly increases the probability of a pro-claim abortion rights ruling-from a predicted 21 percent probability to a predicted 46 percent probability. By comparison, the same change in the Supreme Court's parti san makeup has very little impact on the outcome of a nonabortion gender rights claim-changing the probability of a proclaim outcome only from 77 to 73 percent. This comparison reinforces the conclusions just discussedthat abortion and nonabortion gender rights claims show markedly different decision-making patterns.
NOTES
'Before Reed v. R eed (1971) the Supreme Court had typically applied the "rational standard" test to laws and policies which treated men and women differently. Under this test laws and policies might be upheld even if they were based on traditional or stereo typic gender roles and set out rigid legal distinctions between men and women without considering individual circumstances (Goldstein 1988; Rhode 1989) .
2For a review of this extensive literature, see, for example, Goldstein (1988) ; Markowitz (1989) ; Ginsburg and Flagg (1989) ; Cole (1984) ; Minor (1987) ; Ginsburg (1988) ; Rubin (1986) ; O'Connor and Epstein (1983); Baer (1991) ; Kirp, Yudof, and Franks (1986) ; Rhode (1989) ; O'Connor (1980); and George and Epstein (1991 4In the Webster ruling, the Court declined to pass on the constitutionality of a preamble to the state law that held life begins at conception. The Court also held moot a prohibition on the use of public funds to counsel a woman to have a nontherapeutic abortion. When the Court's majority declined to make a ruling on an issue in this man ner, or when a challenged law was decided on the basis of a very similar facts in a precedent case, the claim is not counted here. In addition to Webster, seven other rulings were coded as involving two or more claims, typically involving a financial claim and a retroactivity claim, or a multi-section abortion regulation: Planned Parenthood v. 7Published figures were updated courtesy of the author. 6This variable was also tested with lags of one, two, four, and five years, but failed to reach statistical significance.
7Poll support for women's roles increased from an (average) value of 54 in 1972 to a value of 72 in 1989 on repeat poll items. On the abortion-related items, poll support for abortion availability fluctuated from a value of 63 in 1972 to a value of 66 in 1989; see NORC codebooks for those years. Items were coded to be consistent with Stimson (1992) .
8For a description of the matching of claims and nationwide polls, see Marshall (1989) ; for a listing of these 20 poll-to-ruling matches, contact the authors.
9The Democratic presidential candidate's share of the two-party vote excludes all votes received by minor party candidates.
10This predictor differs from the Solicitor General predictor when an agency's own attorneys defend a challenged statute, or when the Solicitor General files a position in a dispute not directly challenging a federal law or policy.
11The variables measuring the presence of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, or the variable representing the number of women on the Court was not significantly related to overall support for gender equality claims, to abortion rights claims, or to nonabortion rights claims, either alone or when controlling for the number of Reagan-Bush appointees.
12These conclusions would not change if claims raised by a male were excluded from the analysis.
